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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff Appellee, 
WALLACE LANDON HOWERY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.:930542-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his Circuit Court conviction for Failure to Wear a Safety Belt, an infraction, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated §41-6-182, and Driving Without a Valid Driver's License, a class 
C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §41-2-104. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(d) (appeals from circuit courts). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 16, 1993, the defendant/appellant, Wallace Landon Howery, was convicted after 
bench trial before Judge Michael Burton of the Third Circuit Court of the offenses Driving Without a 
Driver's License, in violation of Utah Code Annotated (UCA) §41-2-104(1), a class C misdemeanor, 
and Failure to Wear a Safety Belt, in violation of UCA §41-6-182(2), an infraction. These offenses 
arose from a traffic stop conducted by Trooper Turner of the Utah Highway Patrol on October 28, 
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1992, in Salt Lake County. Prior to trial, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty and, pursuant to 
UCA §77-7-21(2), demanded that proceedings against him not continue until the filing of an 
Information. An Information setting forth the above charges was prepared, filed with the trial court, 
and presented to the appellant before trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
In his brief, appellant directly raises three points for consideration on review. The first point 
alleges that appellant's due process rights were violated by the trial court's having allowed the 
prosecution against him to have proceeded by use of citation rather than an Information.l The second 
point is that appellant's speedy trial rights were violated. The third point-premised on the appellant's 
contention that Driving Without a Driver's License and Failure to Wear a Safety Belt are secondary 
offenses chargeable only in combination with a primary offense-is that the State failed to charge him 
with, or provide him with disclosure of, the primary offense. The appellant also raised, without 
discussion, the issue of whether it was error for the court, upon his demand, to fail provide him with a 
probable cause statement explaining the basis for the initial traffic stop.2 Each of these issues will be 
addressed below. 
L WAS THE APPELLANT DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
1
 This point is restated by the appellant as follows: "WHEN THE DEFENDANT REQUEST [sic] 
AN INFORMATION PRIOR TO ARRAIGNMENT, IS THE COURT REQUIRED TO HAVE IT 
FILED BEFORE A PLEA IS ENTERED?" (Capital letters from original). 
2
 This issue was restated by the appellant as: "DO THE POLICE NEED A [sic] PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO STOP CITIZENS?" 
Brief of Plaintifl7Appellee 
State v. Howery 
Page 3 
PRIOR TO THE FILING OF AN INFORMATION? 
The appellant contends in his brief that Rule 4(a) and Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and Article I, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution, operate to mandate that commencement 
of a criminal proceeding against a person situated such as appellant not occur until the filing of an 
Information. The brief of appellant offers no analysis in support of this position. Even so, it is possible 
for the State to offer a construction of the provisions of law cited by the appellant toward a resolution 
of this issue. 
Firstly, Article I, Section 13, of the Utah Constitution seems to have no bearing on this issue. 
The purpose of this constitutional provision is to eliminate the need for the bringing of an Indictment as 
the prerequisite to prosecuting charges of criminal conduct. This constitutional provision does not 
reach the issue of whether the State must proceed by Information in cases charging a lesser 
misdemeanor or infraction, but rather deals with the category of offenses prosecutable only upon 
indictment at common law--generally felonies.3 
The appellant more correctly cites to Rule 4(a) and Rule 5(a) for the proposition that 
prosecutions should generally be by Indictment or Information, regardless of whether the offense is 
designated as a felony, misdemeanor or infraction. What the appellant fails to address, however, is the 
fact that each rule begins with the caveat "unless otherwise provided." In cases such as the instant one, 
3
 See, e.g., UCA §77-16-1 (1977) (repealed upon replacement of parts of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure with Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1989), providing that felonies and class A 
misdemeanors be prosecuted by indictment or information, but making no similar provision for lesser 
misdemeanors or infractions. 
Brief of Plaintifl7Appellee 
State v. Howery 
Page 4 
where the person charged with violation of the law is issued a citation rather than arrested, UCA §77-
7-21(2) specifically provides whether and when an Information is required. This statute provides that if 
the person cited enters a plea of not guilty, then the State must proceed by Information unless the 
person waives the filing of the Information. IdL From the operation of this statute, it necessarily 
follows that the appellant was not entitled to demand the filing of the Information prior to his entry of a 
plea. 
The appellant does not complain solely that he was entitled to the filing of the Information prior 
to plea, however, but he also complains of the timeliness of the filing of the Information in relation to 
trial. A reading of the Rules of Criminal Procedure offers no guidance as to the determination of the 
timeliness of filing. Records from the Third Circuit Court, however, indicate that the Information in 
this case was filed with the court on January 27, 1993. No record was found regarding the date on 
which the appellant was served with a copy. 
Regardless of when the appellant actually received the Information in this case, it is incumbent 
on the appellant to demonstrate in what way he was prejudiced by the error complained of. See, e.g., 
State v. Kozile 688 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1984) (error must be substantial and prejudicial in the sense 
that in the absence of the alleged error there is a reasonable likelihood that the result of the trial would 
be different). In this appeal, the appellant has failed to articulate any explanation of his bare assertion 
of prejudice. In considering the fianction of the filing of an Information, it seems extremely unlikely that 
the appellant could make such a showing. The citation issued to the appellant accurately informed him 
that prosecution would commence on the offenses "Seat Belt [in violation of] 41-6-182" and "No Utah 
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D.L. [in violation of] 41-2-104." The citation also noted that the offenses occurred on October 28, 
1992. Given that an offense may be charged by the name given to the offense by the statute, or in 
terms sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge, State v. Bundv, 684 P.2d 58 (Utah 1984), 
the appellant would not have been prejudiced based on the timeliness of the service of the Information 
because the Information provided him with nothing he did not already have notice of. 
Because UCA §77-7-21(2) did not require the filing of an Information in this prosecution until 
the appellant entered his plea of not guilty, because the appellant had been provided notice of the 
charges against him in sufficient detail in both the citation and the Information (which was served on 
him before trial), and because the appellant has not argued that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
trial would have produced a different result if he had been provided sooner with an Information, the 
court should not find this point raised by the appellant sufficient to upset the conviction of the Circuit 
Court. 
BL WAS THE APPELLANT DENIED HIS 
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL? 
In his brief, the appellant alleged a violation of his speedy trial right by citing to Article I, 
Section 11, of the Utah Constitution without argument, apparently implying that his trial was subject to 
unnecessary delay.4 The appellant erred in relying on this provision of the Constitution for his 
Article I, Section 11, provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to 
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delays and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
(Emphasis added). 
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contention because Article I, Section 11, pertains only to civil causes of action. The appropriate 
constitutional provision for the appellant's speedy trial claim is Article I, Section 12, which is captioned 
"Rights of accused persons." 
In considering the speedy trial right guaranteed by Article I, Section 12, the Utah Supreme 
Court has determined that there are four relevant factors: the length of the delay, the reason for the 
delay, the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant resulting 
from the delay. State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986). For convenience' sake, these factors will 
be addressed in reverse order. 
As noted in Kozile supra, prejudice is measured as the reasonable likelihood that absent the 
delay, the result of the trial would be different. Here, again, the appellant has offered no argument 
supporting his assertion of prejudice. Rather than demand that the appellant submit further argument 
on this point, the State will rely on its arguments that the appellant suffered no unreasonable delay. 
Toward showing that the delay alleged by appellant was not unreasonable, the State asks the 
Court to take note of the fact that the appellant has provided no record that he preserved this issue by 
having asserted his right before trial. The Utah Supreme Court taught in State v. Renzo. 443 P.2d 392 
(1968), that a defendant cannot claim the constitutional right to a speedy trial unless he demands that 
the court grant him a trial. 
Regarding the issue of reason for the delay, the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Rasmussea 
418 P.2d 134 (1966), examined the record to determine whether there was an intent to prejudice the 
defendant. In this case, the appellant has not expressed concern of any such prejudicial intent on the 
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part of the State, and absent such a specific allegation, the State is not sufficiently placed on notice to 
respond. The State urges that it should not be required to respond to only a bare allegation (or, in this 
case, an implied allegation) unsupported by argument. 
Finally, regarding the issue of length of delay, the State asserts that there was no unreasonable 
delay at all in this case. UCA §76-1-302 prescribes that the limitations of action for the misdemeanor 
with which the appellant is charged is two years, and one year for the infraction, and provides that a 
prosecution is commenced upon the filing of the information. See also, Renzo, supra. Here, the 
appellant was tried promptly after the filing of the information,5 and assuming even that the one-year 
period of limitations controlled both offenses, prosecution was commenced against him well within the 
time for limitation of actions. Where the appellant does not complain that his preparation of defense 
suffered for the alleged delay,6 and where the appellant does not suffer the disability from delay 
incumbent to one incarcerated or subject to conditions of pre-trial release, it seems that no matter how 
the appellant urges the court to calculate the length of delay, the delay was not unreasonable. 
Because the prosecution against the appellant was commenced and concluded promptly after 
the filing of the information, because no argument has been forwarded asserting that the State intended 
to cause a delay to prejudice the appellant, because the appellant has not shown that he preserved this 
issue for appeal by having asserted his right to trial below, and because the appellant has not shown any 
As noted above, the defendant was not tried until after he was sufficiently appraised of the charges 
against him. 
6
 See State v.Hafea 593 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979) (finding that defendant's defense was not impaired 
by delay relevant toward court's finding that speedy trial right not violated). 
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likelihood that the result of the trial would have been different absent the delay complained of, the 
Court should find that the appellant's speedy trial rights were not violated. 
m. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW 
PROSECUTION WITHOUT THE CHARGING 
OR DISCLOSURE OF A PRIMARY OFFENSE? 
The appellant asserts that the offenses for which he was convicted, Driving Without a Valid 
License and Failure to Wear a Safety Belt, were improperly charged either because the State is obliged 
to charge a primary offense in combination with the above offenses (characterized by the appellant as 
Secondary" offenses), or, in the alternative, the State is at least obliged to provide him with disclosure 
of the primary offense. In support of his alternative proposition, the appellant cites Rule 16(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
The appellant misconstrues the reach of Rule 16(b). Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, captioned "Discovery," addresses what discovery must be provided by the prosecution and 
by the defense, when such discovery must be made, and in what manner. Rule 16(b) prescribes the 
continuing duty of the prosecutor to make the disclosure mandated by Rule 16(a), and Rule 16(a) 
prescribes the material or information the prosecutor must provide in discovery.7 This rule makes no 
Rule 16(a) directs the prosecutor the provide to the defense the following materials or 
information: (1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant of codefendants; (2) the 
criminal record of the defendant; (3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendants; (4) 
evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the degrees of the offense for reduced punishment; and, (5) any other item of 
evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant 
in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
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provision for the type of disclosure demanded by line uppHhinl iihsi ill1 dim turn limn llir1 IHIIII IIIIII 
good cause shown, pursuant to Rule 16(a)(5). The appellant has not argued that the State ignored the 
(iiiTdioii of the i omif I mukr, (tiist/iositii 01 III1.1II lln liiiitl 1 oml iihusril ml1., tliscitlli 11 by null directing 
the State to make the demanded disclosure; therefore, the appellant's reliance on Rule 16 is misplaced. 
Returning to the appellant's principle proposition-that the State was obliged to charge a 
primary offense in combination with the "secondary" offenses, although he does not state this, it seems 
that the appellant is referring to UCA §41-6-184. This statute, found within the portion of the Utah 
Code captioned "MOTOR VEHICLE SEAT BELT USAGE," modifies UCA §41-4-182 (the Seat 
Belt law). It provides: 'Enforcement of this ailid*" h\ sliilr 01 lo< ,,-ti Lw nilon niintt agents si lall be 
only as a secondary action when a driver or a motor vehicle has been detained for a suspected violation 
c • (Emphasis added). No similar provision is 
found in modification of UCA §41-2-104 (the Driver's License law). 
Although a sound analogy may be drawn that a law enforcement agent may not lawfully stop a 
driver to check the status of his license just as he may not lawfully stop a driver to determine if he is 
wearing a safety belt, if the appellant relies on this analogy toward urging that the Seat Belt violation 
and the Driver's License violation must be charged in combination with another offense, he relies too 
much. This enforcement (HovisiN in plainly filing s toil irlmn .t^aitis! iiiiiiillni 11 liumil lo 11  1 In w jniij;a 
safety belt when the driver is lawfully detained for a suspected violation of law; thus, the provision 
does nol IUIIIIM nl.titmnif am >\ lor another violation as a prerequisite to enforcement. The fact that 
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the appellant was not charged with an offense he deems to have been a "primary" offense, then, should 
not per se render the citation for only a "secondary" offense invalid. 
IV. WAS THE APPELLANT ENTITLED TO BE PROVIDED 
A STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE? 
An issue raised by the appellant but not discussed, and alluded to in Point III of his brief 
without argument, is whether the State was obliged to provide to the appellant a document stating the 
lawful cause for the initial stop of the appellant. Contained within this issue are two points: (1) Were 
the appellant's procedural rights abridged by the failure of the State to adduce some proof of the 
charges before proceeding to triaP; and (2) Were the appellant's rights to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure abridged by the initial stop? 
Procedural Issues 
Regarding the first point, because the appellant does not make any specific argument, it is 
unclear exactly what he is demanding, but it seems that he may either be demanding a bill of particulars 
or a proffer by the State of the evidence that would need to be produced to show probable cause at a 
preliminary examination. If the appellant is complaining of not being provided a bill of particulars, no 
record exists to show that the appellant ever made a demand for more precise pleading below, nor that 
he was in doubt as to the nature of the charges against him. Because the appellant cannot show that he 
demanded a bill of particulars below, he should not be allowed to seek redress for this now. State v. 
Bleazard, 133 P.2d 1000 (Utah 1943). 
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If the appellant is complaining of not being provided with a proffer of the facts showing 
probable cause before proceeding to trial, then the appellant is demanding a right provided for under 
Rule 7(g) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that is only available to persons accused of a felony. 
Because the appellant has never been entitled to such a production of evidence by the State, this is not 
an appropriate issue for relief on appeal. 
Search and Seizure Issue 
The appellant complains now that proof of the lawfulness of the initial stop on October 28, 
1992, has not been made. Records from the Third Circuit Court do not reveal that the defendant 
moved for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Trooper Turner had reasonable grounds to stop 
the appellant. Because the appellant has failed to comply with Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, no transcript exists documenting the evidence and arguments of law heard by the 
trial court pertaining to this issue. The record on appeal does show, though, that evidence and 
arguments were heard from the appellant at trial, and the issues were decided in favor of the State. 
Given the presumption that the trial judge correctly applied the law—in that it is the burden of 
appellant to preserve in the trial record errors in the application of the law, and given the burden of the 
appellant to show that the trial judge abused its discretion in resolving factual disputes, in the absence 
of direct argument by the appellant, the reviewing court should defer to the trial court's decision and 
not upset the conviction on this ground. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should find that the appellant was not harmed by the timeliness of the filing of the 
information because the appellant was provided with sufficient notice of the charges against him to 
allow him to prepare his defense. The Court should find that the appellant was not denied his right to a 
speedy trial because he was tried promptly after the filing of the information and prosecution was 
commenced and concluded well within the period of limitation of actions. The Court should find that 
no error exists simply from the fact that the appellant was not charged with an offense other than 
Failure to Wear a Safety Belt and Driving Without a Driver's License. The Court should not find error 
in the failure to provide the appellant with a document of probable cause in that the defendant cites no 
authority entitling him to such a document and he cannot show error with the trial court's treatment of 
this issue. 
Because the appellant has misunderstood the legal points asserted, and because the appellant 
has failed to adequately argue the points raised, the court should affirm the judgment appealed from. 
Respectfully submitted t h i s ^ ^ q s ^ M a y r 1994. 
DAVID E.YOCOM, 
Salt Lake County Attorney, by 
KENNETH R. UPDEGRO 
Deputy County Attorney 
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